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Abstract
The revelation principle is a fundamental theorem in many economics elds. In this
paper, we construct a simple labor model to show that a social choice function
which can be implemented costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium may not be truth-
fully implementable. The key point is the strategy cost condition given in Section
4: In the direct mechanism, each agent only reports a type and will not pay the
strategy cost which would be paid by himself when playing strategies in the original
indirect mechanism. As a result, the revelation principle may not hold when agents'
strategies are costly in the indirect mechanism.
JEL codes: D71, D82
Key words: Revelation principle; Game theory; Mechanism design; Auction
theory.
1 Introduction
The revelation principle plays an important role in microeconomics theory and
has been applied to many other elds such as auction theory, mechanism design
etc. According to the wide-spread textbook given by Mas-Colell, Whinston and
Green (Page 884, Line 24 [1]): \The implication of the revelation principle is ...
to identify the set of implementable social choice functions in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium, we need only identify those that are truthfully implementable."
Related denitions about the revelation principle can be seen in Appendix,
which are cited from Section 23.B and 23.D of MWG's textbook[1].
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Generally speaking, some costs are required for a social choice function to be
implemented by a mechanism. There are two dierent kinds of costs possi-
bly occurred in a mechanism: 1) strategy costs, which are possibly occurred
when agents play strategies; and 2) misreporting costs, which are possibly
occurred when agents report types falsely. 1 In the traditional literature of
mechanism design, costs are usually referred to the former. Recently, some
researchers began to investigate misreporting costs. For every type  and ev-
ery type ^ an agent might misreport, Kephart and Conitzer [2] dened a cost
function as c(; ^) for doing so. Traditional mechanism design is just the case
where c(; ^) = 0 everywhere, and partial verication is a special case where
c(; ^) 2 f0;1g [3{5]. Kephart and Conitzer [2] proposed that when reporting
truthfully is costless and misreporting can be costly, the revelation principle
can fail to hold.
Despite these accomplishments, so far people seldom consider the two dierent
kinds of costs simultaneously. The aim of this paper is to investigate the justi-
cation of revelation principle when both of two kinds of costs are considered.
By constructing a simple labor model, we show that the revelation principle
may not hold only when agents' strategies are costly.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we construct a social choice
function f and an indirect mechanism, where agents' strategies are costly.
In Section 3, we prove f can be implemented by the indirect mechanism in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. In Section 4, we propose a strategy cost condi-
tion by analyzing the basic idea behind the revelation principle. In Section
5, we prove that f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equi-
librium, which contradicts the revelation principle. Finally, Section 6 draws
conclusions.
2 A labor model
Here we consider a simple labor model which uses some ideas from the rst-
price sealed auction model in Example 23.B.5 [1] and the signaling model
[1,6]. There are one rm and two workers. The rm wants to hire a worker,
and two workers compete for this job oer. Worker 1 and Worker 2 dier in the
number of units of output they produce if hired by the rm, which is denoted
by productivity type.
For simplicity, we make the following assumptions:
1) The possible productivity types of two workers are: L and H , where H >
L > 0. Each worker i's productivity type i (i = 1; 2) is a random variable
1 It is usually assumed that each agent can report his true type with zero cost.
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chosen independently, and is private information for each worker.
2) Before confronting the rm, each worker gets some education. The possible
levels of education are: eL and eH , where eL = 0, eH > 0. Each worker i's
education ei (i = 1; 2) is observable to the rm. Education does nothing for a
worker's productivity.
3) The strategy cost of obtaining education ei for a worker i (i = 1; 2) of
productivity type i is given by a function c(ei; i) = ei=i. That is, the strategy
cost is lower for a high-productivity worker.
4) The misreporting cost for a low-productivity worker to report the high
productivity type H is a xed value c
0 > 0. In addition, a high-productivity
worker is assumed to report the low productivity type L with zero cost.
The labor model's outcome is represented by a vector (y1; y2), where yi denotes
the probability that worker i gets the job oer with wage w > 0 which is
chosen by the rm. Recall that the rm does not know the exact productivity
types of two workers, but its aim is to hire a worker with productivity as
high as possible. This aim can be represented by a social choice function
f() = (y1(); y2()), in which  = (1; 2),
y1() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 > 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 < 2
; y2() =
8>><>>:
1; if 1 < 2
0:5; if 1 = 2
0; if 1 > 2
(1)
In order to implement the above f(), the rm designs an indirect mechanism
  = (S1; S2; g) as follows:
1) A random move of nature determines the productivity types of two workers:
1; 2 2 fL; Hg.
2) Conditional on his type i, each worker i = 1; 2 chooses his education level
as a bid bi : fL; Hg ! f0; eHg. The strategy set Si is the set of all possible
bids bi(i), and the outcome function g is dened as:
g(b1; b2) = (p1; p2) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if b1 > b2
(0:5; 0:5); if b1 = b2
(0; 1); if b1 < b2
(2)
where pi (i = 1; 2) is the probability that worker i gets the job oer.
Let u0 be the utility of the rm, and u1; u2 be the utilities of worker 1; 2 in
the indirect mechanism   respectively, then u0(b1; b2) = p11 + p22   w, and
for i; j = 1; 2, i 6= j,
ui(bi; bj; i) =
8>><>>:
w   bi=i; if bi > bj
0:5w   bi=i; if bi = bj
 bi=i; if bi < bj
(3)
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The item \bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) is just the strategy cost paid by agent i
of type i when he performs the strategy bi(i) in the indirect mechanism.
The individual rationality (IR) constraints are: ui(bi; bj; i)  0, i = 1; 2.
3 f is Bayesian implementable
Proposition 1: If w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), the social choice function f() given
in Eq (1) can be implemented by the indirect mechanism   in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider a separating strategy, i:e:, workers with dierent productivity
types choose dierent education levels,
b1(1) =
8<:eH ; if 1 = H0; if 1 = L ; b2(2) =
8<:eH ; if 2 = H0; if 2 = L : (4)
Now let us check whether this separating strategy yields a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium. Assume bj(j) takes this form, i:e:,
bj(j) =
8<:eH ; if j = H0; if j = L ; (5)
then we consider worker i's problem (i 6= j). For each i 2 fL; Hg, worker
i solves a maximization problem: maxbi h(bi; i), where by Eq (3) the object
function is
h(bi; i) = (w bi=i)P (bi > bj(j))+(0:5w bi=i)P (bi = bj(j)) (bi=i)P (bi < bj(j))
(6)
We discuss this maximization problem in four dierent cases:
1) Suppose i = j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = 0)  (bi=L)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=L; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
2) Suppose i = L, j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=L)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=L)P (bi = eH)  (bi=L)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=L; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0 :
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Thus, if w < 2eH=L, then h(eH ; i) < h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is 0. In this case, b

i (L) = 0.
3) Suppose i = H , j = L, then b

j(j) = 0 by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > 0) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = 0)  (bi=H)P (bi < 0)
=
8<:w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0:5w; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
4) Suppose i = j = H , then b

j(j) = eH by Eq (5).
h(bi; i) = (w   bi=H)P (bi > eH) + (0:5w   bi=H)P (bi = eH)  (bi=H)P (bi < eH)
=
8<:0:5w   eH=H ; if bi = eH0; if bi = 0 :
Thus, if w > 2eH=H , then h(eH ; i) > h(0; i), which means the optimal value
of bi(i) is eH . In this case, b

i (H) = eH .
From the above four cases, it can be seen that if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L),
the strategy bi (i) of worker i
bi (i) =
8<:eH ; if i = H0; if i = L (7)
is the optimal response to the strategy bj(j) of worker j (j 6= i) given in Eq (5).
Therefore, the strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) is a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by  .
Now let us investigate whether the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L) satises the
individual rationality (IR) constraints. Following Eq (3) and Eq (7), the (IR)
constraints are changed into: 0:5w bH=H > 0. Obviously, w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L)
satises the (IR) constraints.
In summary, if w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L), then by Eq(2) and Eq(7), for any
 = (1; 2), where 1; 2 2 fL; Hg, there holds:
g(b1(1); b

2(2)) =
8>><>>:
(1; 0); if 1 > 2
(0:5; 0:5); if 1 = 2
(0; 1); if 1 < 2
; (8)
which is just the social choice function f() given in Eq (1). 2
5
4 Strategy cost condition
Before discussing the truthful implementation problem of a costly Bayesian
implementable social choice function, we rst cite the basic idea behind the
revelation principle given in MWG's textbook (Page 884, Line 16, [1]): \If in
mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()), each agent nds that, when his type is i,
choosing si (i) is his best response to the other agents' strategies, then if we
introduce mediator who says `Tell me your type, i, and I will play s

i (i) for
you', each agent will nd truth telling to be an optimal strategy given that
all other agents tell the truth. That is, truth telling will be a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of this direct revelation game".
Although this basic idea looks reasonable, we propose that behind the me-
diator's announcement \Tell me your type, i, I will play s

i (i) for you", an
additional assumption is needed to make this announcement credible: after
receiving each agent i's report i (i = 1;    ; I), in order to playing si (i) for
agent i, the mediator should also pay the strategy cost which would be paid
by agent i himself when carrying out si (i) in the original mechanism.
Generally speaking, the strategy costs can be thought of as nancial costs or
eorts paid by agents when carrying out their strategies. According to MWG's
textbook (Page 883, Line 7 [1]), agents' strategies are either possible actions
or plans of actions. No matter which format the agents' strategies might be,
if the strategy cost occurred in the original mechanism cannot be ignored,
then only when such assumption holds will the mediator's announcement be
credible to the agents. Otherwise none of agents is willing to attend the direct
mechanism, which means the direct mechanism cannot start up. From the
perspective of agents, the above-mentioned assumption is formalized as the
strategy cost condition as follows:
Strategy cost condition: In the direct mechanism, each agent only reports
a type and will not pay the strategy cost which would be paid by himself when
playing strategies in the original indirect mechanism.
Someone may insist that in the direct mechanism, after reporting a type i,
each agent i will still pay the strategy cost related to the strategy si (i).
However, this idea is in contrast to Denition 23.B.5 of the direct mechanism
(See Appendix). By Denition 23.B.5, the only legal action for each agent i is
just to report a type i, and s

i (i) is illegal for agent i in the direct mechanism.
Thus, it is wrong to claim that in the direct mechanism each agent i will still
pay the strategy cost related to the illegal si (i).
Two possible questions to the strategy cost condition are as follows:
Q1: In the above explanation of revelation principle, the mediator is actually
a virtual role and does not exist at all.
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A1: The notion \mediator" can be replaced by the notion \designer", and the
subsequent discussions are the same.
Q2: The designer may dene the direct mechanism more generally. In partic-
ular, The designer denes a new mechanism in which each agent reports his
type, then the mechanism suggest to them which action to take, and the nal
outcome of the mechanism depends on both the report and the action (i.e.,
education level in this paper).
A2: As Myerson pointed out in Ref [7], the concepts of direct mechanism and
revelation principle are in the eld of static or one-stage games. However, the
so-called new mechanism is in the eld of dynamic or multistage games, and
hence is irrelevant to our discussion.
Besides the above two questions, another possible objection to the strategy
cost condition is as follows: \Let us consider the equilibrium in the indirect
mechanism. Given the equilibrium, there is a mapping from vectors of agents'
types into outcomes. Now let us take that mapping to be a revelation game.
It will be the case that no type of any agent can make an announcement that
diers from his true type and do better".
It can be seen that this objection is equivalent to the proof of revelation prin-
ciple (see Appendix Proposition 23.D.1). Suppose the strategy costs cannot be
neglected in the indirect mechanism, let us make a detailed investigation on
the proof of Proposition 23.D.1. Given that an indirect mechanism   imple-
ments f costly in Bayesian Nash equilibrium, consider the equilibrium s() =
(s1();    ; sI()) in Eq (23.D.2), there is a mapping g(s()) : 1  I ! X
from a vector of agents' types  = (1;    ; I) into an outcome g(s()), which
is equal to the desired outcome f() for all  2 1      I . Note that in
Eq (23.D.2) and Eq (23.D.3), the indirect mechanism   works, and the utility
function ui of agent i (i = 1;    ; I) already reects the fact that each agent i
pays the strategy cost related to si (i) by himself.
Now, let us take the mapping g(s()) to be a direct revelation game, in which
the strategy set of agent i is his type set, Si = i, and the designer carries out
the outcome function f(). In this revelation game, each agent i only reports a
type and does not pay the strategy cost except for some possible misreporting
cost, thus the utility function of each agent i should be changed from original ui
to another function u0i, in which the item related to strategy cost disappears.
2
As a result, given that an indirect mechanism   implements f costly in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium, in order to judge whether f is truthfully imple-
mentable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium or not, we should use the new utility
2 An example can be seen in Section 5, agent i's utility function in the direct
mechanism is changed from Eq (3) to Eq (10) and Eq (11), in which the item
related to the strategy cost \bi=i" disappears.
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function u0i instead of ui for each agent i. To be more precisely, the criterion
to judge whether f is truthfully implementable should be updated to judge
whether for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [u
0
i(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [u0i(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (9)
for all ^i 2 i, in which u0i is the utility function of agent i in the direct
mechanism, and is not equal to ui in the original indirect mechanism.
Therefore, the last sentence of the proof of Proposition 23.D.1 is wrong since
Eq (23.D.4) is no longer the condition for f to be truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium when strategies in the indirect mechanism are
costly. Furthermore, with the new utility function u0i, some agent i may nd
it benecial for him to dier from his true type i to another false type ^i
3 .
Put dierently, there may exists i 2 f1;    ; Ig, i; ^i 2 i such that
E i [u
0
i(f(i;  i); i)ji] < E i [u0i(f(^i;  i); i)ji]:
To sum up, the strategy cost condition is the cornerstone for the direct revela-
tion mechanism to start up. However, as we pointed out, it is the strategy cost
condition itself that may change agents' utility functions in the direct mech-
anism. Consequently, a costly Bayesian implementable social choice function
may not be truthfully implementable, which contradicts the revelation prin-
ciple. An example will be shown in Section 5.
5 f is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium
Proposition 2: If the misreporting cost c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the social choice func-
tion f() given in Eq (1) is not truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash
equilibrium.
Proof: Consider the direct revelation mechanism  direct = (1;2; f()), in
which 1 = 2 = fL; Hg,  2 1  2. The timing steps of  direct are as
follows:
1) A random move of nature determines the productivity types of workers:
i 2 i (i = 1; 2), and each worker i reports a type ^i 2 i to the rm. Here
^i may not be his true type i.
2) The rm performs the outcome function f(^1; ^2), and hires the winner.
According to the strategy cost condition, in the direct mechanism, each worker
i only reports a type and does not pay the strategy cost. The only possible
3 An example can be seen in Section 5, in which each worker i = 1; 2 nds it
benecial to misreport ^i = H in the direct mechanism under the condition of
c0 2 (0; 0:5w), no matter what his true type is.
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cost needed to pay is the misreporting cost c0 for a low-productivity worker to
report the high productivity type H . For worker i (i = 1; 2), if his true type
is i = L, his utility function will be as follows:
u0i(^i; ^j; i = L) =
8>>>>><>>>>>:
w   c0; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w   c0; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (10)
If worker i's true type is i = H , his utility function will be as follows:
u0i(^i; ^j; i = H) =
8>><>>:
w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; L)
0:5w; if (^i; ^j) = (H ; H); or(L; L)
0; if (^i; ^j) = (L; H)
; i 6= j: (11)
Note that the strategy cost item \bi=i" occurred in Eq (3) disappears in Eq
(10) and Eq (11). Following Eq (10) and Eq (11), we discuss the utility matrix
of worker i and j in four cases. The rst and second entry in the parenthesis
denote the utility of worker i and j respectively.
1) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = H , j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker i and j is to truthfully
report, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H . Thus, the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) =
(H ; H).
2) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = L, j = H .
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w)
H (w   c0; 0) (0:5w   c0; 0:5w)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker j is still to truthfully
report ^j = H ; and if the misreporting cost c
0 < 0:5w, the dominant strategy
for worker i is to misreport ^i = H , otherwise agent i would truthfully report.
Thus, under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
3) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = H , j = L.
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HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   c0)
H (w; 0) (0:5w; 0:5w   c0)
It can be seen that: the dominant strategy for worker i is still to truthfully
report ^i = H ; and if the misreporting cost c
0 < 0:5w, the dominant strategy
for worker j is to misreport ^j = H , otherwise agent j would truthfully report.
Thus, under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is
(^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
4) Suppose the true types of worker i and j are i = L, j = L.
HHHHHHH^i
^j L H
L (0:5w; 0:5w) (0; w   c0)
H (w   c0; 0) (0:5w   c0; 0:5w   c0)
It can be seen that: if the misreporting cost c0 < 0:5w, the dominant strat-
egy for both worker i and worker j is to misreport, i.e., ^i = H , ^j = H ,
otherwise both agents would truthfully report. Thus, under the condition of
c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H).
To sum up, under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium
of the game induced by the direct mechanism is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and the
unique outcome of  direct is that each worker has the same probability 0.5 to
get the job oer.
Consequently, ^i = i (for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilib-
rium of the direct revelation mechanism under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w),
and hence the social choice function f() is not truthfully implementable in
Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
6 Conclusions
In this paper, we discuss the justication of revelation principle through a
simple labor model in which agents pay strategy costs during the process of
an indirect mechanism. The main characteristics of the labor model are as
follows: 1) In the indirect mechanism, carrying out strategy is costly, i.e.,
worker of type H pays the strategy cost eH=H when obtaining education
level eH ; 2) The productivity type of worker is private information and not
observable to the rm; 3) Misreporting a higher type is also costly, i.e., a low-
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productivity worker can pretend to be a high-productivity worker with the
misreporting cost c0.
The major dierence between this paper and traditional literature is just the
strategy cost condition proposed in Section 4. By the strategy cost condition,
when strategies in the indirect mechanism are costly, the utility function of
agents will be changed in the direct mechanism, hence the criterion to judge
whether f is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium will also
be changed.
Section 3 and Section 5 give detailed analysis about the labor model:
1) In the indirect mechanism  , the utility function of each worker i = 1; 2 is
given by Eq (3), in which the strategy cost bi=i is the key item that makes
the separating strategy prole (b1(1); b

2(2)) be a Bayesian Nash equilibrium
if the wage w 2 (2eH=H ; 2eH=L). Thus, the social choice function f can be
implemented in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
2) Following the strategy cost condition, in the direct mechanism, the utility
function of each worker i is changed from Eq (3) to Eq (10) and Eq (11).
Under the condition of c0 2 (0; 0:5w), the unique Nash equilibrium of the
game induced by the direct mechanism is (^i; ^j) = (H ; H), and ^

i = i
(for all i 2 i, i = 1; 2) is not a Bayesian Nash equilibrium of the direct
mechanism. Thus, the social choice function f is not truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
In summary, the revelation principle may not hold when agents' strategies are
costly in the indirect mechanism.
Appendix: Denitions in Section 23.B and 23.D [1]
Consider a setting with I agents, indexed by i = 1;    ; I. Each agent i pri-
vately observes his type i that determines his preferences. The set of possible
types of agent i is denoted as i. The agent i's utility function over the out-
comes in set X given his type i is ui(x; i), where x 2 X.
Denition 23.B.1: A social choice function is a function f : 1  I !
X that, for each possible prole of the agents' types (1;    ; I), assigns a
collective choice f(1;    ; I) 2 X.
Denition 23.B.3: A mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) is a collection of I
strategy sets S1;    ; SI and an outcome function g : S1      SI ! X.
Denition 23.B.5: A direct revelation mechanism is a mechanism in which
Si = i for all i and g() = f() for all  2 1     I .
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Denition 23.D.1: The strategy prole s() = (s1();    ; sI()) is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) if, for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]
for all s^i 2 Si.
Denition 23.D.2: The mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements the
social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if there is a Bayesian
Nash equilibrium of  , s() = (s1();    ; sI()), such that g(s()) = f() for
all  2 .
Denition 23.D.3: The social choice function f() is truthfully implementable
in Bayesian Nash equilibrium if si (i) = i (for all i 2 i) is a Bayesian Nash
equilibrium of the direct revelation mechanism   = (1;    ;I ; f()). That
is, if for all i = 1;    ; I and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23:D:1)
for all ^i 2 i.
Proposition 23.D.1: (The Revelation Principle for Bayesian Nash Equilib-
rium) Suppose that there exists a mechanism   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) that im-
plements the social choice function f() in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. Then
f() is truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium.
Proof: If   = (S1;    ; SI ; g()) implements f() in Bayesian Nash equilibri-
um, then there exists a prole of strategies s() = (s1();    ; sI()) such that
g(s()) = f() for all , and for all i and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(s^i; s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.2)
for all s^i 2 Si. Condition (23.D.2) implies, in particular, that for all i and all
i 2 i,
E i [ui(g(s

i (i); s

 i( i)); i)ji]  E i [ui(g(si (^i); s i( i)); i)ji]; (23.D.3)
for all ^i 2 i. Since g(s()) = f() for all , (23.D.3) means that, for all i
and all i 2 i,
E i [ui(f(i;  i); i)ji]  E i [ui(f(^i;  i); i)ji]; (23.D.4)
for all ^i 2 i. But, this is precisely condition (23.D.1), the condition for f()
to be truthfully implementable in Bayesian Nash equilibrium. 2
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